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Incomeredistribution, in its many facets, poses extraordinarily difficult
and complex problems for both normative and positive economics. For
normative economics, it has, until recently,' meant irreconcilable con-
flict. With regard to how much redistribution should occur, scholars,
notwithstanding long debate, remain agnostic, as they have been since
Lord Robbins shattered the scientific illusion of classical utilitarianism.2
For positive economics, the realm of this paper, efforts to interpret
redistribution have exposed the limited extent of our progress in over-
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71coming the conundrums of empirical measurement and modeling. The
measurement problem itself poses two broad problems. One relates to
the adequacy and availability of data and the other to the conceptual
difficultiesencounteredindeterminingtheincidenceofpublic
expenditures. While there exist studies of the redistributive impact of
individual general-equilibrium problems have befuddled
efforts to develop convincing estimates of the overall amount of
redistribution.4
The development and empirical testing of positive theoretical models
intended to explain the extent to which individuals and communities
choose to engage in income redistribution has also produced but limited
progress. Existing positive research can be divided into two parts, one
dealing with transfers carried out in the private sector (through charity,
donations of time, and intergeneration gifts)5 and the other, on which this
paper focuses, with income redistribution through government programs.
In a society with a democratic government,6 there are at least two
different, though complementary, ways in which the analysis of public
redistribution may be approached. The first inquires into how much
redistribution will occur and what its pattern may be expected to be.7 The
second starts with the overall pattern of redistribution produced by an
existing government, or by the existence of a particular redistributive
program, and attempts to construct a theory to account for it. In one sense
these two approaches are similar. Both call for a theory that contains not
only a model of individual behavior subject to constraints, but also a
model of the political process through which preferences for goods and
services with "public" characteristics are transmitted. The difference is
that the first approach asks a question that is open-ended, while the
second starts with a particular pattern of redistribution.
This paper adopts the second approach. Its concern is with explaining,
in terms of individual preferences, public redistribution to low-income
persons—to be specific, those distributional adjustments, taken as a
group, that are commonly referred to as "welfare" programs.
A number of recent papers have argued that income redistribution,
through tax-financed, poverty-alleviating income transfers, may repre-
sent a collective response to the existence of nonmarket interactions
between the poor and the nonpoor, the nonpoor being concerned, for a
variety of reasons, with the well-being, or the consumption-leisure
choices, of the poor.8 One ground on which this explanation of income
transfers has been criticizedis that transfer recipients, as well as
taxpayers, have the franchise, so that observed transfers may well be
attributable to the political power of the former rather than to the
preferences of the nonpoor.9 Thus, provided that transfer recipients
exercise their right to vote, the conventional assumption of universal
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.4independent preferences, combined with direct or representative deci-
sion making by majority rule, may in itself be sufficient to account for
transfers to the poor.
While we have no intention of denying that transfer recipients, through
voting, will support programs that provide them with benefits, either
monetary or in kind, the thrust of our argument will be that the support
of recipients, given the voting rules in force, cannot itself account for
the existence of such programs. This does not mean that self-interest
considerations play no part in generating support for redistribution to the
poor. But it does mean that something must be present, in addition to
simple recipient self-interest, to account fully for the redistribution that is
observed.
The remainder of this paper presents the analytical basis for these
remarks and some evidence of individual preferences which seems to
support them. In Part I, we discuss the basis of nonrecipient support for
redistribution. Part II contains a model of redistribution in direct
democracy. In Part III, this model is extended to a setting of indirect or
representative democracy, and we explore how much nonrecipient
support the enactment of redistribution requires. In Part IV, an effort is
made to derive real-world measures of distributional preference from the
responses of a panel of California citizens to queries about welfare
spending and other redistributive expenditures. In Part V, the implica-
tions of these responses are examined in terms of the political models
developed in Parts II and III. Part VI, set at a more general level, offers a
few concluding remarks about the line of reasoning pursued in this paper.
I.THE BASIS FOR NONRECIPIENT SUPPORT
FOR REDISTRIBUTION
Amajor theme of this paper is that the political base on which support for
redistribution rests extends well beyond its direct recipients. We imply by
this that many nonrecipients do not behave like simplistic "economic
men," concerned with their own disposable incomes and the goods and
services these incomes can buy for own-use, and nothing else.
Some nonrecipients, of course, may support redistribution to the poor
for reasons that seem almost as straightforward as those of recipients. A
nonrecipient may support welfare programs because (a) he expects, with
high probability, to himself be a direct recipient at some future time; (b)
he may derive income from some activity that is favorably affected by
such redistributive programs (e.g., farmers presumably have higher
incomes because of food stamps, and social workers receive higher
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salariesbecause of Aid to Families with Dependent Children); or (c) he
may view transfer programs as substitutes for transfers he would other-
wise feel obliged to make privately, entirely on his own (e.g., persons with
parents drawing Old Age Assistance).
But the basis of nonrecipient support for redistributive programs may
extend beyond simple self-interest. Transfers to the poor may be viewed,
as mentioned earlier, as a collective response to nonmarket interactions
between the status or activities of the poor and nonpoor members of the
community. Such nonmarket interactions may take several forms. Non-
recipients may be concerned, for a variety of reasons, with the well-being
of the poor, or at least interested in seeing that all individuals have access
to minimum amounts of certain commodities and services, such as food,
housing, and medical care. Thus, the individual's utility function may
include, as an argument, the welfare (or some proxy for welfare like
income) of other persons, as in
(1)
As specified in (1), A's utility function includes not only his own income,
yAbutC's income, Yc. With this specification, A will desire to make a
transfer to C whenever the rate at which he is willing to trade increments
in own-consumption for increments in C's consumption (his marginal
rate of substitution between own-consumption and C's) exceeds the rate
at which such trades can be made. In the N-person case, where such
demands are satisfied (for familiar reasons) through the political process,
A may well feel that welfare spending, as financed by taxation, satisfies
this condition. Alternatively, if A cares about C's consumption pattern,
e.g., with the food or housing that C consumes, the specification of A's
utility function will be
(2) UA= ...,
where Xe,. ..,are the rates of consumption of each of the n goods
consumed by A andis the amount of X1 which C consumes. In this
case, A will favor transfer activities aimed at increasing C's consumption
of the particular commodities with which he, A, is concerned. He will
tend to favor, say, price subsidies for consumption of these goods to
programs providing C with cash payments.1°
Nonmarket utility interactions may also arise, however, because A sees
the existence of poverty as a source of negative externalities. Although A
may not "care" about C for C's own sake, he may be affected adversely
by particular aspects of C's behavior. In such cases, transfers for him are a
kind of input used to "produce" a reduction in such social maladies as
crime and public health inadequacies.
Hochmanand RodgersIn the discussion that follows, actions directed to the reduction of such
negativeexternalities,aswellastothe maximization of own-
consumption (as opposed to utility) or to the minimization of private
costs (payments for goods and services, directly or through taxes) are
considered to be based on self-interest. Thus, if all individuals act only on
self-interest, to be more precise, "narrow" self-interest, nonrecipient
support for redistributive transfers must derive from nonmarket utility
interactions that are negative or from the motives described as (a) and (b)
in our first set of examples.
On the other hand, we define behavior which results from positive
nonmarket interactions among utility functions as benevolence. Nonreci-
pient support for redistributive transfers that derives from utility inter-
dependencies, as described in the two-person example of equation 1, and
from the motive described as (c) are included in this category.
Our discussion of the implications of nonrecipient support for redis-
tribution concerns itself only with the existence, not the pattern, of
benevolence. At issue is whether individuals, through the mechanisms of
public choice, support transfer programs that enable others to augment
their consumption, not whether the beneficiaries are relatives or friends
or anonymous persons, identified only by, say, inferior income status.
Note also that benevolence, in our definition, is fully consistent with
the maximization of own-utility. Individuals support transfers that are
based on benevolence because they reflect preferred income allocations.
Such transfers are, then, a matter of "rational" calculus, consistent with
the private utility functions of the actors. It is for this reason that such
choices can be accommodated within the corpus of economic theory.
Nothing that we say implies that benevolence is based on altruism.
Altruism, which Webster's dictionary defines as "unselfish concern for
the welfare of others," relates to motivation, not preference, and implies
something more; namely, selflessness. Strictly speaking, therefore, in an
analysis grounded in the postulate that choice is "rational," in the sense of
being consistent with an objective function that is internal to the indi-
vidual, altruism is an empty box.
II.REDISTRIBUTION IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Thissection begins our attempt to determine the circumstances under
which a political democracy may be expected to produce redistribution to
the poor. It deals, as a first step, with the simple but revealing case of
direct democracy, in which the political community votes directly in
referenda on public programs rather than for representatives who vote
TheSimple Politics of Distributional Preference 75on such programs in legislatures. Part III then turns to the more complex
and realistic case of representative democracy.
One important determinant of the amount of redistribution is the
voting rule through which the community reaches its decisions. If unani-
mity is required, preference independence and income certainty, taken
together, suffice to rule out all redistribution. Only if the unanimity
requirement is relaxed can redistribution occur in a model that abstracts
from both interdependent preferences and uncertainty. More plausible,
however, is the assumption that simple majority rule prevails, implying
that a motion will be adopted if favored by (N+ 1)/2 of the voters. What
we wish to determine is whether, with this voting rule, redistribution
favoring the poor is likely to be enacted.
Assume that (a) each person has one vote and (b) the distribution of
income among persons is unequal. One might predict, then, following
Anthony Downs (1957), that the 51 percent of the voters with the lower
incomes would enact a tax on the 49 percent with the higher incomes and
transfer the proceeds to themselves, each member of the "coalition"
receiving an equal share of the redistributive pie.
A three-person model provides the simplest example that can illustrate
this kind of redistributive outcome of direct democracy. Suppose three
voters, A, B, and C, have initial incomes of Y°B,andY°c, where
Y°A>Y°B>Y°c. By assuming away incentive effects so that each party
maintains his market income at Y°, regardless of which redistributive
policies are adopted, the situation can be characterized as a constant-sum
game. If income redistribution among the three members of the commun-
ity is the only issue with which public choice deals, and if revenue is
obtained from the members of the group through the taxation of income
at a single tax rate, t, the characteristic function of this game can be
identified in terms of the payoffs to the various coalitions that may form.
(3) i.V(A)=V(B)=V(C)=O
ii.V(A,B)=tY,; V(A,C)=rYb;
No payoff is available to one-member coalitions such as V(A). Two-
member coalitions receive an amount tl', where the income that is taxed
is that of the excluded party. Since Y°A> Y°8> the payoffs in the
threepossible two-member coalitionsarerankedasV(B, C)>
V(A, C)> V(A, B). The highest payoff is earned by the coalition (B, C)
which excludes A, the highest-income voter, and this result is the basis for
the Downsian conclusion that the 51 percent coalition will consist of the
voters with the lowest incomes in an N-voter model.
The second part of this Downsian solution, which specifies that B and C
will share equally in the gains, is not necessarily compelling. To obtain
this result, one seems forced to make some very special assumptions
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1about expectations. B and C, for example, may anticipate that unequal
sharing would significantly enlarge the chance of their coalition proving
unstable. The prospect that the (B, C) coalition will disintegrate and
permit the formation of another coalition from which one of them is
excluded must be assumed so unfavorable that neither will risk demand-
ing a disproportionate share of the coalition gains. There is no compelling
reason, however, why either B or C must be so risk averse.11
We may now inquire how likely it is that the redistribution that
democratic societies effect on behalf of the poor will reflect the kind of
coalition that emerges in our example, viz., a (B, C) coalition with equal
sharing. Clearly, one of the main problems with this is that the maximum
income at which a voter can remain eligible for transfers in the real world
is far below the median. A substantial number of those at the top of the
bottom 51 percent receive zero cash transfers and, absent all interdepen-
dencies positive or negative, would vote for transfers only if they view the
existence of such programs as a means of generating private income (i.e.,
as suppliers) or as a kind of insurance against the hazard of becoming
impoverished.'2 That these motives apply for all those in the bottom 51
percent of voters with incomes too high to be eligible for redistributive
transfers is open to considerable doubt. Those nonrecipients who see
private gain in transfer programs, after accounting for their shares of the
tax costs, are unlikely to be more than a very small minority of the voting
population. Nor is the receipt of welfare payments now treated as a right
to which persons are "entitled." The barriers erected to exclude the
"undeserving" poor from recipient status and to prevent cheating serve
also to reduce the insurance value of the programs to those who are not
poor. There is, moreover, no reason for the nonpoor to content them-
selves with programs that provide only insurance benefits, as they would
surely be better off with actual transfers. For various reasons then,
existing welfare programs, in which means tests exclude a large number of
voters with incomes below the median from benefits, are not easily
accounted for by the simple Downsian coalition hypothesis.
Within the context of a direct democracy model, what alternative
hypothesis can we invoke to account for transfers to the poor? One
alternative is to assume that voters with above-median incomes have
utility functions that reflect interdependence. This being the case, they
may support and willingly consent to finance transfers to that one-fifth to
one-quarter of the population that they classify as poor.
As far as the theory of redistribution in direct democracy is concerned,
what does such nonrecipient support imply? In terms of our three-person
model, the fact that high-income A may derive benefits from transfers can
be examined on the assumption that such benefits are greater if the
recipient is low-income C, rather than B. This would be true, presumably,
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if the source of A's benefits is positive utility interdependence, as in
equations 1 and 2. It would also be true if A perceives a link between low
income and crime.
On these assumptions, it is clear that a coalition of A and C is much
more likely, relative to one of B and C, than it was in the previous
analysis. B's support need no longer be obtained to enact a transfer
program, and A has an incentive to break up a (B, C) coalition if it should
form, not just to reduce his tax bill, but to assure that the transfers will be
used in what he thinks to be a more appropriate way (going just to C
instead of to B as well as C).
These conclusions may now be applied to an N-voter model. If some
individuals with above-average incomes benefit from income transfers to
the poor, a phenomenon that simple self-interest models, with no
recognition of externalities, are hard put to explain, ceases to be a
mystery. Given a transfer program which restricts net payments to, say,
the low 20 percent of the income distribution, it is very difficult to assure
the support of a majority in a model which ignores utility interdepen-
dence. But recognition of nonrecipient support surmounts this difficulty.
III.REDISTRIBUTION IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY
Politicalmodels in which public decisions are made by popular vote
describe but a limited number of real-world situations. The lion's share of
collective decisions are made in representative bodies. Thus, it is to an
analysis of the redistributive policies that may be expected to emerge
from such representative assemblies or legislatures that we now turn.
Consider a hypothetical community of 25 persons, divided geographi-
cally into five equal parts, among which there is no short-run mobility.'3
These parts can be considered districts, provinces, counties, or states. In
each district one person is elected by simple majority vote to serve as
member of the community's legislature. It is assumed that this person
clearly perceives the preferences of the majority responsible for his
election and honors these preferences when voting in the legislature.
Decisions in the legislature are also made by simple majority rule and, for
purposes of the present argument, on an issue-by-issue basis with no vote
trading. Finally, the legislature concerns itself only with policies explicitly
designed to redistribute income—its jurisdiction is a kind of special
district with a distributional mandate.
Assume initially that voters, as in the Downs model, have independent
preferences and that no person fails to exercise the franchise.'4 Thus,
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.4each voter unfailingly votes for the candidate who supports programs that
yield him the largest positive fiscal residual (the transfers he receives less
the taxes he pays). A description of the decision-making process implicit
in these assumptions is provided in Figure 1. Each column represents one
FIGURE1
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of the five districts, D,toD5,andthe five cells in each column represent
the five voters in this district. A representative is elected by majority vote
from each district, and the assembly therefore contains five representa-
tives. In Figure 1, an Xis displayed in a cell if the voter approves and votes
for a proposal; an 0 is displayed if the voter opposes it. As is apparent
from Figure 1, with simple majority rule, both in voting for representa-
tives and in voting on legislation, a motion may be enacted if favored by
a minimum of nine voters. This is because three representatives must vote
for enactment, and each, to be elected, must be favored by at least three
constituents.'5
To illustrate the implications of such a model, we may examine several
situations. These differ in their assumptions about (a) the number of
people eligible for transfers and (b) their dispersion among the districts.
Throughout, the redistributive program is assumed to be explicit, with
upper-income groups being taxed at a uniform rate t and the receipts
being distributed uniformly to those with incomes below some specified
level. We are not concerned with what this level is or how it is decided, but
take it as given. In the illustrations that follow, each person in each district
is either eligible for transfers and thus designated "poor" and identified
by an X, or pays taxes to finance transfers, in which case he is called
"rich" and is identified by an 0.
A distribution of poor voters among districts like that represented in
Figure 1 illustrates the situation in which the number of "poor" people
(assuming simple self-interest—no utility interdependence—on the part
of the rich) required to enact redistribution is at its minimum of nine. If
TheSimple Politics of Distributional Preference 79one of the poor were to shift from D1 to, say, D4, the redistributive
proposal would fail. Hence, it is clear that the spatial distribution of
supporters is crucial. Another way of demonstrating this is to consider the
situation represented by Figure 2. Here, even though the "poor" number
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The general implication of these illustrations is that redistribution is
bound to be enacted, no matter what the distribution of the poor among
districts, if their number exceeds sixteen—with a population of twenty-
five and majority rule in force—and that redistribution will never occur if
the poor are less than nine. However, if the poor number between nine
and sixteen, inclusive, their distribution among districts determines
whether redistribution will occur. In the general case of K districts, each
with N persons, at least 25 percent of the population must be poor if
redistribution on their behalf is to occur, and it is enacted in this case only
if the poor are evenly distributed over (K + 1)12 districts and absent
entirely from the remaining (K— 1)/2.16
Now consider the implications of utility interdependence on the part of
the nonrecipient rich. Assume, for the sake of argument, that there is no
negative externality basis for redistribution, so this interdependence is
entirely a matter of benevolence. If there are more than sixteen poor, the
effect of introducing such interdependence into the twenty-five person
model is nil, inasmuch as redistribution would be enacted in any case.
However, with sixteen poor or less, interdependence can bring about
redistribution which would not occur without it. This effect can be
illustrated for two extreme cases:
a.If there are sixteen poor, distributed as in Figure 2, only one of the
nonrecipients in D1, D2, or D3 must be benevolent, to a degree
80 Hochman and Rodgerssufficient to be made better off by redistribution, to reverse the
outcome.
b.With, say, but one poor person in each district, a much higher









Here, six is the minimum number of benevolent nonrecipients (the
minimum of nine supporters minus the three poor blokes in any three of
the other five districts). The maximum number of rich who can be
benevolent without assuring legislative enactment of redistribution is
eleven, the maximum of sixteen less the five poor, distributed one to a
district.
Forthe relevant cases (situations in which the number of poor is less
than seventeen), the implications of nonrecipient benevolence can
conveniently be summarized in a table of "minimum requirements," such
as Table 1. While the transfer recipients must number at least nine (must
exceed 32 percent of the population) with no benevolence, its introduc-
tion can reduce the minimum number of recipients to one. The implicit
arithmetic is simple. In political effect, the rich, if benevolent, are perfect
substitutes for poor recipients. Depending on the overall spatial distribu-
tion of supporters, a benevolent minority among the nonpoor can assure
the passage of legislation that transfers income to the poor, and this
minority need be nowhere near so large as it must be with the same
decision rule in direct democracy.'8
Several issues of practical policy and constitutional politics can be
discussed in terms of this model. The first is the impact of reapportion-
ment as a means of long-run recourse open to a defeated opposition on
the redistributive outcome. At one level of analysis, the answer to this
question must remain indeterminate. To know the effects of reapportion-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4essential to the analysis of redistribution through the public sector. What
we can point out here is that to the extent that all constituents have
intense feelings (either positive or negative) about redistribution relative
to other issues, logrolling is not likely to be an important factor.
A second complication, also with some real-world importance, is that
rates of voter participation, obviously much less than 100 percent, tend to
vary directly with income. The analytic equivalent of such variation in
voter participation, in terms of our model, is a disproportionate reduction
in population, which eliminates more potential voters with low incomes
than with high incomes. Other things equal, inverse voter participation
reduces the ability of the poor to gain income transfers through use of the
political process. By raising the minimum proportion of nonpoor who
must favor a redistributive proposal to obtain its legislative enactment, it
increases the importance of nonrecipient support in accounting for
observed transfers to the poor.
IV.EVIDENCE OF DISTRIBUTIONAL PREFERENCE
Otherthings being equal, direct recipients of income transfers, together
with those who think themselves likely to become recipients, can be
expected to look favorably upon redistributive programs. To assure this,
one needs only the comfortable assumption that the marginal utility of
net increments in disposable income (the difference between transfers
and perceived taxes) is sufficient to offset any implied costs in terms of lost
privacy associated with the transfer process itself.2'
But preferences of nonrecipients, which are transmitted through a
political process that sets out to define new programs or to propose
changes in the level or content of existing programs, are less transparent.
In representing nonrecipient demands, one may, to start, presume that
the capacity and taste for redistributing income vary with conventional
socioeconomic and demographic indexes. Thus, even if all nonrecipients
have identical tastes for redistribution, their willingness to transfer
income—the "effectiveness" (marginal relevance) of their demands—
will vary with these indexes (in other words, income and other claims,
implied by family size, age, and so on, on nonrecipient resources).
Unfortunately, data that indicate the incidence of utility interdepen-
dence, benevolent or other—much less the critical levels the enactment of
redistributive motions require—are not only difficult to delineate, but are
difficult to obtain. Indeed, even if such data were identifiable, the fact that
political institutions do not generate data in the required form precludes
definitive investigation. Since what one has to work with is fragmentary
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I85and imperfect, little choice remains but to arm oneself with such tenuous
assumptions about patterns of preference interdependence as seem to fit
the evidence and institutions and to proceed.
To examine redistribution in direct democracy, one can turn to, as
Wilson and Banfield (1964) have done, voting patterns in public expendi-
ture referenda with redistributive overtones, involving school tax deci-
sions or the capital financing of such facilities as a general hospital with a
low-income clientele.22 Or, in examining referendum voting on such
measures as Proposition I (the California tax initiative rejected in
November 1973, which proposed the constitutional restriction of public
expenditures), one may introduce into the relationship variables used to
explain the voting outcomes in precincts or census tracts that putatively
reflect utility interdependence, as Levy (1974) has done. Where infer-
ence about the prevalence and strength, much less the political signifi-
cance, of interdependencies is at issue, however, these procedures have a
number of drawbacks. Citizen perceptions of the implicit distributional
implications of the proposals under study are bound to be imperfect, not
just because voters differ in fiscal sophistication, but because such effects
are inherently unclear. This may not only affect how people vote but
whether they vote. Moreover, the data examined, which represent
averages for voting precincts or census tracts, can only provide evidence
of central tendency, indicating median voting behavior (in terms of
income, education, or other indicators of preference) within such political
units. Our political models, on the other hand, indicate that it is the
distributional preferences of critical minorities that determine whether
proposed redistributive measures are successful. While it is possible to
infer something about the size and composition of such minorities from
cross-section voting data, provided detailed information on voter charac-
teristics within political units exists, this is at best a tricky business.
Thus, to study actual and (for political acceptance) necessary levels of
nonrecipient support for redistribution, it seems worthwhile to seek data
in which the individual voter is the unit of observation. Periodic polls of a
sample of California voters by the Field Research Corporation appear to
be a workable mine of such data. Several of the Field poils conducted
during 1970 (in May, August, and November) posed a variety of
questions, designed to ascertain attitudes toward government expendi-
tures in general and toward welfare spending in particular, to just over
half of their samples of more than 1,100 voters. The focus on welfare
spending, the most obvious means of redistribution to the poor, was
attributable to the fact that Governor Reagan had made welfare reform a
major issue in his reelection campaign. A defect of these data is that they
measure intention, without enforcement of performance, rather than
revealed preference. In one sense, however, this is a virtue, for it
86 Hochman and Rodgers
Jeliminates the distortions of actual distributional preferences that occur
in candidate voting, where there is issue packaging, and in logrolling,
which figures significantly in legislative decision making.23
Distributional preferences, as implied by responses to the welfare
spending questions of the 1970 California polls, are summarized in Table
2. Income is the primary classification variable, in recognition of its
importance in determining whether utility interdependencies are margin-
ally relevant, and whether respondents are likely to be welfare
recipients.24 The sample responses have been recalculated (producing
but minor changes of a percentage point or two) to reflect California
population weights, which are, aside from vagaries of voter participation,
measures of voting strength. Though the May, August, and November
samples from which the data were compiled included different respon-
dents, the responses are assumed to be comparable.
Within each income group (summarized in rows 1 through 3 of Table
2), the responses may be interpreted as the data of a simple cumulative
function, though one for which the variable which interests us, attitude
toward spending, is qualitative and discontinuous. The family of such
functions (one for each income-bracket column in Table 2) describes
variation, with income, in respondent satisfaction with particular welfare
spending levels, relative to the existing level and to a regime in which
there would be no welfare program at all. Rows 1 through 3 of the table
each indicate a different respondent attitude. Row 1 measures the
percentage of respondents who believe that some level of welfare
spending (a level which is greater than zero but by an unspecified amount)
must be considered a "moral imperative." Such persons responded with
"agree strongly" or "agree somewhat" to the statement: "In spite of
some waste in the welfare program, it would be morally wrong to do away
with it." Row 2 indicates the proportion who consider the present level of
welfare spending either "adequate" (that is, not too frugal) or "insuffi-
cient" (that is, desiring that it be increased). Taken together, we interpret
these respondents as viewing the present level as "not unduly generous."
This is obviously a weaker and more inclusive indication of support than
that registered in row 3 by respondents who think that the present level of
welfare spending is insufficient and desire more.
On inspection, a number of implications seem clear. First, only a small
percentage of persons in any income bracket oppose any and all welfare
spending. Only 11 percent do not feel that it is a "moral imperative" to
maintain some positive level of welfare spending.
Second, in each of the three rows there is in general a systematic break
in the relationship between the response percentages and income at
roughly $7,000, and this income is interpreted as the breakpoint between
the actual and potential welfare recipient population and the nonrecip-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ient population.25 The decline in what appear, on the whole, to be
favorable attitudes toward welfare spending may be interpreted as
reflecting a rise, with income, in its net "price," more than sufficient to
offset any increases in "tastes" for redistribution. Several factors contri-
bute to this: (a) direct variation of the tax cost of income transfers with
marginal tax rates and (b) inverse variation with income of the monetary
benefit of transfers, because the probability of ever being poor declines
and welfare programs consequently become a much worse form of
insurance.
Third, only in the $3,000 to $5,000 group (where the figure is 25
percent) do less than 36 to 47 percent believe that the existing level of
welfare spending is "adequate," a characterization that implies an
absence of any demand for increases in such programs. The difference
between the 25 percent response rate in this group ($3,000 to $5,000)
and the 44 percent response in the lowest group (less than $3,000) seems
to be primarily a matter of differences in age composition and in
experience with the inadequacies of existing levels of welfare payments.26
In examining Table 2, one might inquire why proweif are sentiment is
less than unanimous in those income groups in which direct recipients are
likely to be concentrated. Higher levels of redistributive transfers are,
after all, in their apparent private interest. Doubtless, a part of the answer
is that the Field polls inquired about attitudes toward welfare spending
and not, more inclusively, about redistributive transfers or, in even more
general terms, about income transfers, including those like social se-
curity, which are at least partially (even if more in perception than fact)
annuities financed by prior social insurance payments. Some of those in
the lowest income groups are, moreover, transients who had incomes that
were below long-run expectations in the year concerned. Others, such as
the "working poor," may well have taken the survey questions literally,
interpreting them as referring to a particular package of welfare pro-
grams, monitored through complex rules and regulations that they
consider unpalatable. These rules may have made them ineligible or
made their participation so uncomfortable that they registered negative
responses even though they could be quite favorably disposed toward
such familiar systems of "no strings" income transfers as the Family
Assistance Plan or a demogrant system of the type proposed by Senator
McGovern in 1972. Without probing deeper through further questions
(an alternative not available to us) there is no way of telling which of these
motivating factors were operative, or to what degree.
The responses themselves offer little in the way of precise basis for
inferring the motives of nonrecipient support. In this regard, agreement
that "it would be morally wrong to do away with" welfare spending is of
some help, inasmuch as it does indicate benevolence, as we have defined
90 Hochman and Rodgersit, but it does so, strictly speaking, only for marginal departures from
program levels of zero. As Part I has indicated, however, benevolence,
deriving from a sense of fairness or caring about the well-being of others,
is but one basis of nonrecipient support.27
The role of negative externalities, grounded in a distaste for behavior
patterns associated with absolute or relative deprivation, must also be
considered. It should be stressed that these need not be founded on a
dislike of the poor. They may derive, for example, from presumed
implications of poverty for the stability of the social and politicalfabric, or
the quality of community life.
A crude, though suggestive, attempt to distinguish positive or benevo-
lent interactions from negative utility interactions as the basis for
nonrecipient support of welfare spending is made in rows 4 and 5ofTable
2. For hints into the real-world operation of the models of democracy that
Parts II and III have presented, these rows contain some of our most
interesting data. Reactions to the statement: "If it weren't for welfare,
there would be a lot more stealing, burglaries, and other crime," are
recorded in row 4. Among nonrecipients, agreement with this statement
(responses of "agree strongly" and "agree somewhat") is here inter-
preted as an indication of support for redistribution (a belief that welfare
spending is desirable) on grounds of negative utility interactions and not
on grounds of benevolence. The strong inverse relationship between
income and agreement that "welfare prevents crime" is worth noting. It
suggests that those most experienced with crime (which in prevalence
varies inversely with neighborhood quality and, thus, income) seem most
convinced that the statement is correct.
As far as negative interactions deriving from crime itself are concerned,
these figures are, of course, at most an upper limit—more likely an
overstatement—to which nonrecipient support does not derive from
benevolence. Here, however, for the sake of argument, we treat the
responses in row 4 as a proxy for all negative sources of nonrecipient
support.
Differences between the responses to "welfare is a moral imperative"
(row 1) and "welfare prevents crime" (row 4) are reported in row 5.
These derived figures are then our measures (in a sense, minimum
measures) of the frequencies with which benevolence itself is a factor in
distributional preferences, in the sense that nonrecipients prefer some
positive level of welfare spending.28 That "net" benevolence, thus
measured, varies directly with income is what one would expect if
"concern for the well-being of others" is a normal good.
The frequencies in row 5 rise from 18 percent among respondents with
incomes under $3,000 to 56percentamong those with $20,000 or more.
Among all those who are presumed to be nonrecipients (those over
TheSimple Politics of Distributional Preference 91$7,000) its range is 39 to 56percent,and its average incidence is 47
percent.29 However, since some respondents who agree that "welfare
prevents crime" did not consider it a moral imperative, the deductions
row 4 provides are too large. The 47 percent figure should, therefore, be
adjusted upward by 3 percent, producing a corrected estimate of 50
percent. In the context of our political models, in which low frequencies
of nonrecipient benevolence can be crucial, this minimum estimate of the
incidence of benevolence in nonrecipient preferences must be considered
quite significant.
The substantive focus changes in row 6 to the form in which non-
recipients prefer their redistributive transfers to the poor to be made. At
issue here (and in the remaining rows of Table 2) is whether the levels of
self-perceived well-being of recipients—or alternatively, their consump-
tion patterns or work-leisure choices—are the basis of donor concern.
In models of democracy without benevolence, all transfers will be in
cash. Transfers in cash provide a wider range of consumption options and
will be preferred by recipients who enact redistribution on their own
behalf. On the other hand, in models with benevolence (or negative
utility interactions), nonrecipient preferences are also relevant, both in
determining whether redistribution will occur and in establishing its form
and amount. If nonrecipient support does not derive from concern with
the self-perceived well-being of transfer recipients, but extends to the
sources or uses of their incomes, cash transfers may no longer be
preferred. Specifically, if the utility interdependence of the marginal
donor in the coalition required to enact a redistributive motion is of the
particular-commodity type, the preferred transfers will be in kind and not
cash. Row 6, taking up this issue, indicates nonrecipient reactions of
"agree strongly" or "agree somewhat" to the statement posed in the
November 1970 poll that "it's only fair for government to provide good
housing for people who can't afford it." Because a different sample was
used in November, comparisons with the August responses for inference
about patterns of benevolence and the preferred form of income transfers
must be taken with a large grain of salt. Still, provided one has a bit of a
speculative bent, such comparisons are enlightening.
The responses in row 6 can be interpreted loosely as evidence of donor
concern with the consumption patterns rather than the general well-being
of recipients. In the housing case, this might have any of a number of
sources: concern with how well recipients are housed, an objection to the
aesthetics ofill housing or, to stretch a point, an aversion to the
implications of housing inadequacies for social behavior. For the
moment, there is no need to discriminate among these explanations; it
can simply be assumed that the response frequencies in row 6 are an
upper limit on the incidence of particular-commodity interdependence,
92 Hochmari and Rodgersment, one must specify the initial situation, the specific inter-district
reallocation of voters that it contemplates, and the constitutional con-
straints under which it operates. But a specific example can illustrate
some of the possibilities.
Suppose that the legislature has passed a redistnbutive proposal and
that Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of its supporters, consisting of
both the poor and the benevolent rich (denoted by B). In this setting,
reapportionment that shifts any individual from district 1)4toD5(orvice
versa) can have no effect, for both of these districts are opposed to
redistribution in any case. But the outcome may be quite different if
reapportionment affects one of the districts in which a majority supports
redistribution. If, for example, reapportionment shifts a benevolent
person from D3toD4,itchanges to one in which three out of five
representatives (those from D3,D4, andD5)opposeredistribution,
resulting in its termination.
FIGURE4
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At another level of analysis, the possibility of reapportionment, at least
in a long-run sense, may make redistribution more difficult to effect. This
is true, for example, if significantly less than 50 percent of the community
supports redistribution, while a decision to reapportion requires but a
simple majority among the electorate. To see this, one need only observe
that if, say, only nine persons out of twenty-five secure the enactment of a
redistributive program, a substantial majority opposes it. If reapportion-
ment can be carried out in any manner whatsoever, no matter how
arbitrary, itis an easy matter for this majority to bring about the
redistricting needed to terminate the program. In the real world, of
course, reapportionment is constrained by rules governing the geographi-
cal basis of representation, rules which require, for example, spatial
continuity within jurisdictions. This constraint limits the efficacy of
TheSimple Politics of Distributional Preference 83reapportionment as a means of recourse to a defeated majority. Still, on
the average, the prospect of reapportionment does increase the minimum
level of overall support under which redistribution is likely to be
enacted.19
Metaphorical swords, however, usually have two edges. Just as the
possibility of reapportionment can limit the ability of a minority as small
as 9/25tosecure enactment of a redistributive program, so it can also
prevent a minority of 9/25fromblocking the passage of such a program.
Reapportionment can, for example, easily convert the situation in Figure
2, in which redistribution is favored by 16/25 of the population but fails,
into a situation in which redistribution will occur.
It should be noted, finally, that reapportionment can make the
outcome of collective decision making in representative democracy more
like the outcome under direct democracy only if apportionment decisions
are themselves decided by a simple majority rule. In contrast, if, say,
three-fourths of the population must approve reapportionment, its
potential impact is nullified.
A related issue, similarly elucidated by our model, concerns the effect
of the spatial distribution of potential recipients, the poor, on the
likelihood that a transfer program will be enacted. Put a bit more
pragmatically, it is relevant to ask whether the poor are likely to enjoy
more political success (obtain larger per capita transfers) if they are
dispersed across districts or concentrated. Our model suggests that this
question is relatively easy to resolve. In the absence of nonrecipient
support, neither concentration nor an even distribution among districts
benefits potential recipients. Where there are ten such persons, the
implications of an even distribution of two per district and the concentra-
tion of all ten in but two districts are the same—redistributive proposals
will fail. To make the most of their numbers, potential recipients must be
"semidispersed."2°
Clearly, the model of representative democracy that this section has
presented is innocent of many of the realities of collective decision
making. A number of complications are, therefore, apparent. Two of
these, hitherto ignored, are discussed here, together with some modifica-
tions that they might require.
The first complication is that collective decisions are often outcomes of
a logrolling process in which representatives trade votes on different
issues. To gain support on issues on which they hold strong views,
representatives may either vote for legislation to which they (and, on our
assumptions, their constituents) are mildly opposed or vote against
legislation which they mildly favor. Such behavior immediately takes us
beyond the confines of our simple single-issue model and poses the
question of when an extension of the model to accommodate logrolling is
84 Hochman and Rodgersas opposed to general and nonspecific utility interdependence with which
we are concerned here.3°
Our specific interest in this connection is with the interpretation that
might be given of the responses of individuals with incomes above the
breakpoint, which is, in this case, $5,000 rather than $7,000. Among such
respondents, 38 to 51 percent of those agreeing that welfare is a moral
imperative did not express the opinion that government is obligated to
provide good housing for those who cannot afford it (see row 7). The
theory suggests two possible reasons for this. Either these respondents
were concerned with the overall welfare and not the consumption
patterns of the poor, or they were not concerned with the poor at all, but
supported welfare spending because of a belief that it prevents crime or
ameliorates other undesirable side effects of poverty. To "net out" the
effects of such negative interactions, we then deducted the "provide
housing" responses from the calculated "net" benevolence levels (in row
8) rather than deducting them only from the "moral imperative"
frequencies (as in row 7). Of course, "helps prevent crime" and "good
housing" are not mutually exclusive as this procedure taken by itself
implies. Many observers would argue that the housing component of
welfare spending plays a major role in its effect on crime. Row 8's "net"
estimates of benevolence, attributable to general and nonspecific, rather
than particular-commodity utility interdependence, are minima in two
ways: first, because the "prevents crime" frequencies place an upper limit
on nonrecipient support that is not attributable to benevolence; and
second, because of overlap among responses to the "prevents crime" and
"provide housing" queries.
Taken at face value, the negative net frequencies in row 8 of Table 2
suggest that nonrecipient support for redistribution is (strictly) a matter
of particular-commodity interdependence for respondents with incomes
between $5,000 and $10,000. From $10,000 to $15,000, the netfigure is
effectively zero and warrants a similar interpretation. Over $15,000,
however, it rises from 4 percent to a maximum of more than 24 percent
among respondents with incomes over $20,000.31 This is a large enough
frequency to suggest with some force that donor concern with the
self-perceived well-being of welfare recipients is a normal good which
holds little interest at or near the breakpoint between recipients and
nonrecipients but which is in significant demand among voters in the top
decile of the income distribution. This inference, based on the indications
of distributional preference summarized in Table 2, lends strength to the
argument (developed elsewhere)32 that support of redistribution by the
rich, in the coalitions required to enact welfare programs, varies directly
with income and is disproportionately derived from those donors with the
highest incomes.
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whether nonrecipient donors are concerned with levels of self-perceived
welfare among the recipient population or with the potential levels of
their money incomes.33 Donor aversion to work disincentives is evident
in public discussion of redistributive proposals (in connection, for
example, with the family assistance legislation and, in particular, with
income-maintenance experimentation) and is corroborated by the almost
uniformly positive poll responses to the statement that "no able-bodied
man who is healthy enough to work should be allowed to collect welfare"
(summarized in rows 9 and 10 of Table
Within the present frame of reference, the differences between non-
recipient responses on the "moral imperative" and "able-bodied man"
issues may be taken as evidence of a minimum level of interdependence in
which the recipient's welfare, pure and simple, rather than his earned
income is what counts. The average of these differences, which vary but
little across income classes, approximates 10 percent. This contrasts with
the 50 percent estimate of the incidence of "net" benevolence implied by
the differences between the responses to the "moral imperative" and
"welfare prevents crime" statements. It may, therefore, in a very rough
sense, be interpreted as a lower limit on the extent to which nonrecipient
supporters of welfare spending are likely to support a simple program of
cash transfers coniaining no work requirement provisions.
V.IMPLICATIONS OF NONRECIPIENT SUPPORT
UNDER DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEMOCRACY
Thissection examines with the derived evidence from the California polls
the degree to which nonrecipient support for welfare spending (or
opposition to it) is essential to its enactment. We do this by treating the
queries posed to the California sample in the May and August 1970 polls
as though they were referenda or legislative motions. The relevant
responses, classified by respondent income, are reported in row number 3
of Table 2 and in Table 3. Table 4 displays the levels of nonrecipient
support required for enactment of each of these motions, under a variety
of decision rules, given the levels of support that recipient groups have
evinced.35 These decision rules range from a minimum of one-fourth to a
maximum of three-fourths. One-half is obviously the operative require-
ment for the overall population for a referendum decided under direct
democracy with majority rule. One-fourth and three-fourths define the
limiting cases for the model of indirect democracy developed in Part II.
Population distribution and apportionment are, however, seldom favor-
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1able enough to permit these minimum coalitions to pass or block any
motion. Thus, from a practical standpoint, limits of one-third and
two-thirds seem more sensible, and even these may well be too wide.
In May 1970 poll interviewees were asked (in separate open-ended
questions) which, if any, of a list of eight government programs categories
involving large expenditures of money they would like to see "increased
or kept at the same level of spending" or "reduced in spending." Table 3
summarizes the frequencies with which the respondents mentioned
welfare spending. 36 Since some 7 percent of the interviewees mentioned
welfare spending in neither case, some inconsistency is reflected in the
responses. The inconsistency decreased with income, producing an
upward bias in the support level required to enact a legislative motion
proposing an increase in welfare spending and a downward bias in the
level of nonrecipient support required to defeat it.37
The legislative motions implicit in the May 1970 questions for which
distributional preferences are indicated (in Table 3) are set out in rows
la, ib, 2a, and 2b of Table 4. The right-hand side of this table reports
TABLE3Responses to Distributional Preference Questions on
May 1970 Poll
(Sample percentage responses weighted to reflect
California population)
Income ($1,000) and Income Distribution
(in parentheses)
Less More
than 33—5 5—77—10 10—15 15—2Othan2OAll
(10%)(10%)(11%)(21%) (27%) (14%) (6%)(100%)
1.Increase or
maintain the same 64 75 67 59 56 52 43 59




in (1) or (2) 18 9 11 4 4 10 — 7
NOTE: Theexplanation relates to the various rows.
Frequency with which "welfare spending" was mentioned by respondents when interviewer
stated: "Here is a list of some government programs which require large expenditures of money.
Which would you like to see increased or kept at the same level of spending?' The query was
open-ended, and the responses were neither mutually exclusive nor constrained, either by a budget
limitation or by a requirement that priorities be specified.
2.Responses to: "Here is a list of government programs which require large expenditures of money.
Which would you like to see reduced in spending?" The same comments apply as in row I.
3,No mention of welfare in either of the above responses, reflecting implicit inconsistency. Note that
this inconsistency is, on the average, lower for the income groups of $7,000 and above.
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-JTABLE 4Referenda Implicit in Attitudes toward Welfare
Spending
(Sample percentage responses weighted to reflect
California population)
—Income8— Required Support among Those
LessMorewith Incomes of $7,000 or More
thanthan to Achieve Indicated
Implicit Referenda
$7,000 $7,000 Population Support Level
on Welfare Spending (32%) (68%)1/41/31/22/33/4
Questions on May 1970 Poll
la.Increaseor maintain
the same 68 55 8 19 43 66 78
lb."Don't" decrease 81 60 3 14 38 61 73
2a.Decrease 19 40 27 39 62 86 97
2b."Don't" increase
or maintain
the same 32 45 22 34 57 81 92
Questions on August 1970 Poll
3a.Spend more 39 22 19 31 55 80 92
3b."Don't" spend more 61 78 8 20 45 69 81
NOTE: The population is apportioned between the 32 percent with incomes "less than $7,000" and the 68
percent with incomes "$7,000 and above." This breakpoint, we assume, distinguishes between
respondents who, given current economic status, are or have a significant likelihood of becoming
welfare recipients. The choice of $7,000 rather than $5,000 as the breakpoint between the current and
potential "poor" (recipients) and the "rich" (individuals who are unlikely to become recipients) is
based on an apparent discontinuity in the responses, thus in distributional preferences, at this income
level.
Figures in the right-hand half of Table 4 indicate percentage levels of support among the population
with incomes of "$7,000 or more" required to achieve the indicated overall level of support (acrots all
income groups) for the implicit referenda on welfare spending listed at the far left.
Support levels indicated in I a and 2b are derived from reactions (and the negative complement of
reactions) to: "Here is a list of government programs which require large expenditures of money.
Which would you like to see reduced in spending? Which would you like to see increased or kept at the
same level of spending?" and its negative complement. These questions were asked in the May 1970
poll.
Required support levels in 3a and 3b are derived from the response of "more money" to "Where
should welfare, relief, and poverty programs fit in our government spending?" and its negative
complement. This question was asked in the August 1970 poll.
8The figures in parentheses are population weights.
levels of nonrecipient support required for this enactment. For both the
"increase or maintain" and the "decrease" questions, required support
levels for the negative complement ("don't decrease" and "don't
increase or maintain") have also been calculated to delimit the signifi-
cance of the response inconsistencies discussed above. Inspection of
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ATable 4 indicates that the inconsistencies were not very important, since
their effect, which was to produce differentials of approximately 5percent
across the board in nonrecipient support requirements, was not very
important.
The necessary levels of nonrecipient support in a referendum on
whether "more money" (as distinct from enough to "increase or main-
tain" the present level) ought to be spent on welfare programs are
reported in rows 3a and 3b of Table 4. These figures are derived from
the August 1970 responses summarized in row 3 of Table 2 and discussed
in Part IV. Although, as mentioned earlier, the composition of the May
and August samples differed, so that the responses are not strictly
comparable, these outcomes are consistent with what one would expect,
given an inverse relationship between the extent to which utility inter-
dependence is relevant at the margin and the price of acting upon it. Still,
the low level of support for higher welfare spending ("more money")
among respondents with incomes of "less than $7,000" is puzzling. One
possible explanation is that the August queries were not phrased in the
open-ended language of the May questions but in terms of spending
priorities, thus imposing an implicit but rough budget constraint into the
calculus of the respondents.
In understanding Table 4, it is useful first to think of the implicit
referenda as if they had been proposed in a regime of direct democracy,
with enactment requiring overall support of 50 percent. In this case,
enactment of an increase in welfare spending requires support (given, as
the first column indicates, 39 percent support among the "poor") from 55
percent of the nonrecipient rich, while the assent of but 40 percent (a
rough average of the 38 and 43 percent in rows la and ib) is required to
pass a motion to "increase or maintain." To effect a "decrease" in welfare
spending, on the other hand, 60 percent of the "rich" (a rough average of
62 and 57 percent) must consider the present level of welfare spending
too high.
These figures may now be contrasted with the actual frequencies. In
fact, only 22 percent of the "rich" would like to see welfare spending
increased, while 40 to 45 percent would like it decreased. However,
virtually 60 percent, the same proportion enactment requires, favor its
being "increased or maintained." There seems then a clear implication
(to the extent the California samples are representative) that the existing
level of welfare spending is stable,38 at least under simple majority rule.
The fact that nonrecipient support levels of three-fifths to four-fifths are
required to pass on all two-thirds positive motions, and roughly a
one-third minority among nonrecipients is in all cases sufficient to block
any two-thirds motion for change in the present level of welfare spending,
supports this conclusion.39
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range, in theory, from 25to75percent.In consequence, the variety of
possible levels of required nonrecipient support multiplies. With a given
decision rule, and the information Table 4 contains, one may work
through the prospects of each motion, under whatever assumptions about
voter participation (among recipients and nonrecipients) and the "opti-
mality" of the spatial distribution of supporters (apportionment) he may
wish to make. Since the character of this exercise is clear, specific
discussion does not seem necessary at this juncture.
It is now possible to return to our crude estimate of the lower limits on
"net" nonrecipient benevolence and "nonrecipient support for a cash
transfer" program without work requirements and inquire, speculatively,
into their implications for the likely success of proposals to institute
transfer programs. Recall that the first limit, 50 percent, was derived from
the "moral imperative" and "welfare prevents crime" responses and the
second, 10 percent, from the deduction of the "able-bodied man"
(implying a concern with the effects of income transfers on work
incentives) from the "moral imperative" responses. The former can then
be interpreted as a lower bound on the extent of nonrecipient support for
some sort of cash redistribution program, whereas the latter indicates the
minimum level of nonrecipient willingness to support such a program
without imposing work requirements.
That some program of cash transfers can be enacted, whatever
the decision rule, seems apparent if 50 percent isthe operative
limit of nonrecipient benevolence. Even the 10 percent figure, which
permits some defection of recipients, is likely to be consistent with
enactment if, as the case may be in representative democracy, only
one-third of all voters must agree. However, the data, as available,
provide no grounds on which to base estimates of the magnitude of
such programs.
As indicated in the earlier discussion, the limits in themselves simply
indicate prevalence and do not measure the significance or marginal
relevance of benevolence at the current level of welfare spending, the
base to which the implicit motions considered in Table 4 refer. To
ascertain this, we require a heroic assumption about the rate at which
income transfers beginning from a base of zero succeed in internalizing
benevolence. To this end, assume for the sake of argument that the basis
for nonrecipient support for income transfers to the poor is simple
positive utility interdependence, that all welfare spending at the start is in
cash, and that the initial level of cash transfers from which departures are
being considered internalizes half the benevolence that would be present
at a zero level of transfers. The implied operative limits of nonrecipient
support for marginal changes in the initial level of cash transfers (as
98 Hochman and Rodgersdistinct from maintenance of the program at its current level) are then 25
and5percent.
The levels of required nonrecipient support spelled out in Table 4
indicate, in this case, that in direct democracy (in a referendum decided
by simple majority rule) there is no "positive" motion to "increase or
maintain" the level of transfer programs that could pass. But, depending
upon the spatial distribution of their supporters, the same motions, set
forth under representative democracy, might well stand some chance of
success. If, for example, the distribution of supporters is ideal, so that
overall support of but 25percentis required, motions to "increase or
maintain" and "spend more" would both do well. This also seems true for
the former if one-third support is required.4° On motions to decrease
welfare spending, the benevolence limits imply that three-fourths sup-
port is simply unattainable and that other, less restrictive support levels,
such as two-thirds, are unlikely to be attainable.
Admittedly, such argumentation is tenuous, as it must be, given the
character of the evidence at our disposal. It does, nonetheless, suggest
directions in which research must proceed if our practical understanding
of the workings of democratic political process is to be meshed with
theoretical models of public choice that attempt to interpret it. What is
needed, first, as in discussing more conventional topics, are better
structural models, with tangible counterparts in empirical evidence. To
characterize democratic processes in terms of such models, one requires a
consistent body of microdata, capturing the preferences of the individual
actors upon which politics builds. To obtain such data, a suitable panel
must be subjected to a carefully structured series of questions, capable of
measuring gradations in preference and linking choice, grounded in
such preference, to the price and reward systems implicit in public
policies. The applicability of such data would be much less limited than
that grounded in hypothetical binary choices. For the researcher
interested in distributional preferences, the best of all worlds would
provide matched data, relating preferences, as discerned through such
surveys as the California polls that we have used, and voting through
which such preferences are revealed.4' It is obvious that this is a great deal
to ask. And as if it were not already enough, or too much, the ambitious
scholar may even hope for data that relate the choices of legislators and
legislatures, adjusted somehow for their constituents.42
VI.CONCLUSION
Theclassical preoccupation with income distribution enjoyed a renas-
cence in the 1960s. In motivation, this was largely pragmatic, a matter
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ofdiscomfort with the apparent coexistence of social deprivation and
general prosperity, rather than analytic interest in the empirical dimen-
sions of an elusive social optimum. Disenchanted with the structure and
the outcome of prevailing property rights, which define claims to human
and nonhuman capital, some writers went so far as to suggest that
distributive justice requires a radical restructuring of social institutions,
holding that there is no way in which the social and economic system, in its
present form, can accommodate the adjustments they think "necessary."
Others, more cautious, and, frankly, more committed to liberal values,
argued that more redistribution would occur if only the democratic
political process and the social programs it produces could be made to
more accurately reflect the "true" preferences of the voters from whose
consent they derive.
For the practicing social scientist, which way of posing these issues is
more accurate is less interesting than the question of which is more open
to inquiry. To us, the apparent stability of a distributional outcome that
conforms with voter preferences seems sufficient to make the investiga-
tion of redistribution as a matter of public choice, within a predefined
system of rights and rules, the prior research topic. It seems more
efficacious to make use of familiar concepts and methods, even when they
can be adapted only with difficulty to current concerns, than to disregard
them and seek, like Lancelot, a new paradigm.
Recently within the public choice frame of reference, some considera-
ble effort has been devoted to the normative question of how much
income redistribution is appropriate, and whether its form should be cash
or kind. Treatment of the positive counterpart of this issue, the effort to
determine the kinds of preferences reflected by income transfers carried
out through private charity and public programs, has been much less
satisfactory. As means of explaining redistribution, the basic deficiency of
traditional neoclassical analysis resides in its formulation of the objec-
tives, thus the preferences, which motivate voters and politicians. The
requirement that rational behavior be consistent with simple self-
interest, in particular, makes it far more difficult than need be to explain
redistributive activities. The appropriate extension of the neoclassical
paradigm, which permits more realistic interpretation of redistribution,
introduces choices which reflect benevolence into the objective function.
In the present paper, we have developed this theme by building utility
interdependence into models of redistribution in direct and indirect
democracy. Perhaps our most significant conceptual finding is that
widespread, much less universal, benevolence need not be postulated in
order for its impact on the distributional outcome to be substantial. We
have also attempted, using data from poll responses, to determine some
of the dimensions of nonrecipient support for redistributive transfers
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Athrough welfare spending. We believe the results are quite striking and
offer support for assertions about the existence of benevolence and the
significance of its impact on redistributive outcomes.
NOTES
1.See Aaron and von Furstenberg (1971), Becker (1969), Buchanan (1968), Goldfarb
(1970), Hochman (1971), Hochman and Rodgers (1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, and
1974), Johnston (1972), Mishan (1972), Musgrave (1970), Olsen (1969, 1971a,
1971b), Pauly (1970), Peterson (1972), Rodgers (1973), von Furstenberg and
Mueller (1971).
2.Robbins (1932), PP. 136—143.
3.For example, an estimate of the redistributive effects of the U.S. farm program is given
in Schultze (1972).
4.See McGuire and Aaron (1970) and Gillespie (1965).
5.SeeBecker (1969), Dickinson (1962), Hochman and Rodgers (1973), and Schwartz
(197 1).
6.By a democratic system of government, we mean a set of institutional arrangements
governing the procedures through which a community arrives at collective decisions in
which individuals compete for the votes of a broadly based electorate. On the
appropriateness of defining political democracy in this way, see Schumpeter (1942),
Chapters 21 and 22.
7.Since an infinite number of transfer patterns are consistent with any total amount of
redistribution, any discussion of this subject must also specify who pays and who
receives. But the level of redistributive activity has some importance independent of
its pattern, since it gives an indication of the proportion of resources that the
community is devoting to transfer activities. For a discussion suggesting that a society,
with certain institutions and rules, may be caught in a prisoner's dilemma and
excessively engage in these activities, see Tullock (1971a).
8.See the references cited in note 1.
9.See Buchanan (1972).
10.For more detailed consideration of these nonmarket interactions in the two-person
and N-person cases, see Hochman and Rodgers(1969), Rodgers(1973), and Rodgers
(1974).
11.The essential difficulties in the view that (B,C)with equal sharing is the most likely
outcome of the redistribution "game" can be seen by examining this solution more
closely and comparing it with some alternatives. If the (B, C)coalitionforms and votes
to tax A, collecting IYA, B and C, with equal sharing, each receive IYA/2. The
redistribution pattern in each period is then (—tYA, tYA/2, tYA/2). Whether this
represents a stable solution depends on the deals that B and C, respectively, can strike
with A, the expectations of each party about the behavior of the others, and the
aversion of each party to the uncertainties associated with instability.
To consider one possibility, A could bribe either B or Cto forsake the coalition and
to join with him. If either B or Cwere offered anything more than IYAI2, either would
be willing to defect the (B, C) coalition. At first sight, the bargaining range might
appear to be between tYA and tYAI2, for C must receive at least tYA/2 in a coalition
with A, while A would be agreeable to a coalition with C that costs him anything less
than ti'4. But this potential gain to A and Cfrom forming a coalition as an alternative
TheSimple Politics of Distributional Preference1101to (B, C) actually understates the potential gain, since the (A, C) coalition can also tax
B, obtaining an additional tYB. If, then, an (A, C) coalition forms, it would clearly be
possible, even with no redistribution from B, for both A and C to be better off. But
with redistribution from B, both A and Cstand to gain even more. If Cis content with
3/4 IYA and 1/2 tYB, A will suffer a net income loss of only 3/4YA—1/2
tYB =t(3/4YA —1/2YB). Moreover, if ti'81/2 tYA, A need pay nothing at all to C
in order for Cto be better off in a coalition with A than in (B, C). But before the reader
gets the impression that an (A, C) coalition is more stable, he should note the
possibility that B might be able to induce A to foresake C by agreeing to give A a
sizable amount of his income. The possibilities are endless. Indeed, the situation is not
unlike price warfare among a group of oligopolistic firms; and the outcome is
indeterminate for much the same reasons.
12.The notion that income redistribution through the fiscal structure may, in part, serve
the function of income insurance has a substantial intellectual history and is much
discussed in the literature. See, for example, Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Chapter
13, and the summary discussion in Rodgers (1974).
13.This assumption rules out the location effects on which the Tiebout thesis focuses
(1954). Implications of redistribution for location are described and discussed in
recent papers by Buchanan (in Hochman and Peterson 1974) and Pauly (1972).
14.Later in the analysis, we drop this assumption and consider the significance of voter
participation rates and variation in such rates across income classes.
15.In general, with K districts, each containing the same odd number of people, n, the
minimum number who must favor legislationforitsadoption,isgiven by
[(K+1)/2][(n+1)/2]. Thus, the smallest fraction of voters who must support a





As n and Kco,the last three terms in the right-hand parentheses drop out and the
value of this expression approaches 25 percent. See Buchanan and Tullock (1962),
pp. 220—221. We have borrowed our diagrammatic representation from them.
16.With a bicameral legislature, in which constituent sets in the two houses overlap, the
minimum percentage is likely to be higher. However, consistencies in voting, as
between representatives of the same district in the two houses, and offsets across
districts imply that it is unlikely to come at alt close to doubling.
17.Note that the payment per recipient will differ in cases (a) and (b) if the tax cost of
redistribution is the same for each nonrecipient. Suppose that the tax rate on the rich is
a flat 10 percent, that rich persons all have incomes of $20,000 and that each poor
person has an income of $4,000. Then in case (a) the nine nonrecipients each pay
$2,000 and the payment to each poor person is $18,000/16 or $1,125. The single rich
person who is benevolent gives up $2,000 to see the incomes of each of the sixteen
poor persons raised by $1,125. Each of the other nonrecipients is made worse off since
they have independent preferences. In case (b), if the benevolent rich distributed are
such that only six are required to enact redistribution, the total tax collected is
20 x $2,000 =$40,000,and each poor person receives $40,000/5 =$8,000.
18.Table 1 also illustrates how small differences in benevolence may produce substantial
differences in the degree to which societies (contrast, for example, Sweden, Great
Britain, and the U.S.) pursue egalitarian social policies.
19.Related to this, for distributional adjustments at subnational levels of government, is
the observation that voters, if dissatisfied with distributional connotations, can move
102 Hochmanand Rodgersaway. This is the phenomenon of "voting with one's feet" on which the so-called
Tiebout thesis rests. One implication of utility interdependence, justifying redistribu-
tive income transfers, is that the structure of local communities is more stable than a
public choice model with independent preferences might suggest. As potential trans-
fer recipients enter a community, responding to the generosity of its welfare levels, the
price of liberalism rises, leading marginal supporters of redistributive activity to
emigrate and making any given level of redistributive activity more costly for those
who remain. This process feeds upon itself. In these circumstances, whether redis-
tribution will be maintained at its initial level depends on the conflicting population
flows, with recipients moving in and erstwhile nonrecipient supporters moving out.
20.For the case of racial integration, this suggests that partial dispersal of the ghetto,
limited to jurisdictions in which the formation of sympathetic coalitions is feasible,
may be a much more effective means of increasing the political power of the minorities
than the reinforcement of concentration (ghetto-gilding) or equi-proportional rep-
resentation (total integration).
21.With respect to welfare spending, there are only a few obvious cases in which this
assumption, with nontrivial likelihood, might be expected to fail. One is where the
welfare authorities apply a "man in the house rule" or pry into private morals in
screening applicants for "Aid to Dependent Children." Another is where inquiries
into financial status offend potential recipients of, say, "Old Age Assistance." Even in
these circumstances, however, it seems unlikely that the implied costs in terms of
privacy will predominate for any more than a minority of the individuals concerned.
22.Note, however, that the examples Wilson and BanfIeld (1964) have cited need not be
redistributive in the larger sense. Favorable votes, as for the hospital, need not imply
benevolence or "public-regardingness" at all, but a desire to drain off the low-income
population, permitting more effective segregation of community health facilities by
income or race.
23.In general, it seems preferable to ask the reader to grant our awareness of the
problems inherent in the sampling techniques of the Field Surveys, through which the
data were derived, and just as important, the objective imperfections of the questions.
Exhaustive presentation of qualifications, already too familiar to anyone who has
worked with such data, would add little but boredom.
24.Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the poll did not ask whether the
respondent was or had been a welfare recipient.
25.Consider, for example, the difference between the 38 to 40 percent support for an
increase in welfare spending among those with incomes of less than $7,000 and the 14
to 25 percent levels of support among those with incomes of $7,000 or more.
26.In the under $3,000 bracket, 72 percent of the respondents were sixty years of age or
older, while only 49 percent of these in the $3,000 to $5,000 bracket were over sixty.
A larger proportion of elderly respondents may feel that welfare is inadequate because
fewer are likely to be recipients of both welfare and social security, and retirees, even if
receiving socialseurity, may not identify with welfare recipients. However,
Radosevich (1974), in a careful study of nonsupport among the probable net reci-
pients, found that age itself did not seem to account for such deviant responses. What
seemed important, rather, was the interaction between age and level of education,
inasmuch as nonsupport was more likely among those with high school or less than
three years of college (as opposed to even less or more education).
27.One might also, as we mentioned in Part I, attribute a portion of nonrecipient support
for welfare to government employees or others with a private interest in the magnitude
of public programs. Aside from utility interdependence or insurance, however, there
seems no reason for government employees, except for those who are direct suppliers
of welfare spending, to be more favorably disposed to it than the average voter.
TheSimple Politics of DistributionalPreference 103Indeed, if welfare competes with other uses of public funds, the incentives that face
government employees who are not directly involved in supplying welfare services are
quite the opposite.
28.This ignores support which derives from expectations of income insurance benefits
and the support, based on self-interest, of government welfare workers. Both these
sources of demand are likely to be small, the former because few people with 1970
incomes over $7,000 are likely to view welfare programs as providing more than
the remotest possibility of potential direct benefits, and the latter for the reason
already given, because the proportion of social workers in the total population is
small.
29.In examining row 5, note that the rise in net benevolence with income runs counter to
the decrease in the percentage of respondents who considered welfare spending a
moral imperative.
30.Implicitly, we are assuming here that the housing responses are an adequate proxy for
all types of particular-commodity interdependence, as we did with the crime re-
sponses and negative utility interactions. As a source of income augmentation,
recipients, other things being equal, may be expected to view such in-kind transfers as
inferior to cash, though they will certainly prefer them to nothing at all. If sophisti-
cated, however, they may realize that the dollar value of transfers obtainable in kind, if
interdependence is of the particular-commodity type, may well exceed that of
transfers obtainable in cash.
31.Presumably, this maximum would be even Larger with a more detailed income
breakdown above $20,000.
32.See Hochman and Rodgers (1969), Section IV.
33.See Rodgers (1973), Peterson (1973), and Zeckhauser (1971).
34.That these responses were not unanimous may be attributed to recognition of the
income deficiencies of some "working poor" and to the failure of this statement to
discriminate between voluntary and involuntary unemployment.
35.Part V maintains the assumption that those with incomes of less than $7,000 are
recipients and those with incomes of $7,000 or more are nonrecipients. This may well
be an oversimplification. The issues the California polls posed were in terms of
attitudes toward spending or public spending generally rather than in terms of income
redistribution. The reasons why "recipient" groups are not unanimous in their support
of motions proposing that welfare spending be increased or maintained have been
discussed earlier.
36.Since these questions as posed were open-ended, the mention of welfare spending may
be taken to imply that the respondent did not think it insignificant. That welfare
reform was, as noted earlier, an issue in the ongoing gubernatorial primary campaign
must certainly have strengthened such feelings.
37.One may speculate on the reasons for such inconsistencies, though they are of doubtful
importance here. Such explanations include, for example, imperfect tax-consciousness
(varying inversely with income) and general indifference. Surprising though it may
seem for some respondents wishing to limit the number of their responses to
open-ended questions, welfare spending may have been less salient than, say, educa-
tion, the environment, and law enforcement.
38.Whether the present level of spending is stable because respondents are more
comfortable with a program level to which they have been accustomed and thus favor
the status quo, or viewing the political process as rational, as we have, because this
levelaccurately reflects median voter demand, is beyond the informational
capabilities of the data at hand.
39.As William Niskanen has pointed out, the two recent presidential candidates who took
strong, though opposing, positions on the adequacy of present levels and systems of
104 HochmanandRodgerswelfare spending, Senators Goldwater and McGovern, were both soundly defeated.
While this bit of circumstantial evidence supports our inference that the present level
of welfare spending is stable, at least in terms of distributional preference, the reasons
why one should not overstress it are obvious.
40.In general, Table 4 indicates that motions to "increase" or "increase and maintain"
welfare spending have a somewhat better chance of success, given the parameters,
than motions to decrease it.
41.It would be useful to find out if individuals, some months after voting, would repeat
their choices if given the opportunity to do so. The 1973 and 1974 Gallup and Harris
polls assessing the popularity of President Nixon were, to be sure, evidence of
modified preference attributable to changes in perceived "prices" and "rewards."
42.Davis and Jackson (1974) provide an example of this, but make no use of underlying
data on individual preferences.
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Hochman and Rodgers (H & R),in their paper on "The Simple Politics of
Distributional Preference," are concerned with "explaining, in terms of indi-
vidual preferences, public redistribution to low-income persons" and, in particu-
lar, with explaining "those distributional adjustments taken as a group that are
commonly referred to as 'welfare' programs" (p. 72). Observing that (in the
United States, at least) the actual recipients of welfare transfers are not
sufficiently numerous to cause a system of direct or representative democracy
to institute such programs against the will of all nonrecipients, H & R focus their
attention on the sources of nonrecipient support for redistribution which must
be present to account for the existence of welfare programs.
The paper explores three related but separable topics. PartIconsiders
potential sources of nonrecipient support for redistribution. PartsII and Ill
construct and analyze simple models of redistribution under direct and represen-
tative democracy in order to determine how much nonrecipient support is
necessary for the enactment of redistribution programs. Part IV attempts to use
the results of certain public opinion polls to assess the actual sources and
magnitude of nonrecipient support for redistribution in the United States, and
Part V examines whether or not this support is sufficient to account for the
enactment of U.S. welfare programs when considered in the framework of the
models of democracy previously constructed.
1.Sources of Nonrecipient Support for Redistribution (PartI.)H &
A distinguish three major categories of such support: simple self-interest,
concern for others, and negative externalities. Simple self-interest can arise
from: (a) the expectation of becoming a recipient at a future time; (b) participa-
tion in activities whose income potential is affected favorably by the demand
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-Jshifts accompanying redistribution; or (C) the prospect of having public transfers
substitute for otherwise unavoidable private transfers to dependents. Concern
for others can be characterized by an individual utility function including as an
argument not only the individual's own income but also the income of another
person, or some variable that contributes positively to the welfare of another
person. Negative externalities can generate nonrecipient support for redistribu-
tion when it is expected that redistribution will help to reduce the impact of
certain social maladies (e.g., crime, disease) on nonrecipients.
Among these sources of nonrecipient support for redistribution, H & R
introduce asignificant distinction between those involving "narrow self-
interest" and those involving 'benevolence." "Narrow self-interest" is said to
underlie support due to sources (a) and (b) of simple self-interest, as well as
support due to negative externalities, The term "benevolence" is used to
characterize support due to source (c) of simple self-interest and support due to
concern for others. H & R emphasize that both of these basic motives—"narrow
self-interest" and 'benevolence"—are perfectly consistent with a rational
calculus based on the maximization of own-utility by individuals; their analysis
can therefore be grounded in the corpus of orthodox economic theory.
2. Models of Redistribution under Democracy (PartsII and Ill.)H & R
seek "to determine the circumstances under which a political democracy
may be expected to produce redistribution to the poor" (p. 75) first by
considering the simple case of direct democracy and then by turning to the more
complex case of representative democracy. Under direct democracy with
simple majority rule, it would take a 51 percent coalition of voting citizens to
enact a redistributive program. In the absence of nonrecipient support, such a
coalition would have to be formed by the 51 percent of voters with the lowest
incomes. As H & A observe, such a model cannot explain existing welfare
programs in the United States because large numbers of voters with incomes
below the median are excluded from welfare benefits. Either the voting behavior
of many nonrecipients is governed by considerations other than simple self-
interest, or the direct democracy model is inapplicable to welfare-program
decision making in the United States, or both.
H & R go on to note that direct democracy is in fact rarely exercised in
real-world situations; most collective decisions are made in representative
bodies. They then construct a model of the decision-making process in which
voters in separated districts elect district representatives by majority vote.
These representatives, in turn, vote directly by majority rule on explicit redis-
tributive programs, taxing all personsabovea given income level and redistribut-
ing the proceeds uniformly to all persons below that level.
In such a model of representativedemocracy, the circumstances underwhich
a redistribution program will be enacted depend not only on the number of
citizens who favor it but also on their distribution among districts. In general, H &
A show that there is a minimum proportion of voter support e which is necessary
to pass a bill under optimal spatial distribution, and a minimum proportion /3
which will get the bill passed under any spatial distribution. As the number of
108 Comments by Weiss kopfvoters and districts increase, the values of a and fi approach 25 percent and 75
percent, respectively.
H ,& R draw several conclusions from this model. First, in a representative
democracy a smaller proportion of voter support can (under certain cir-
cumstances) enact redistributive programs than in a direct democracy; one
might be able to explain existing welfare programs in the United States on the
basis of minority support from recipients plus a limited number of nonrecipients.
Second, reapportionment of districts brought about by a defeated majority can
make the outcome of collective decision making in a representative democracy
more like the outcome of direct democracy if reapportionment decisions
themselves require less than j3 in total voter support. Finally, the optimal spatial
distribution of a political minority—from the point of view of their political power
in a representative democracy—is neither concentrated nor evenly distributed,
but "semidispersed."
H & A mention two significant limitations of their model when confronted with
real-world processes of decision making in democracies. One is the model's
failure to take into account the process of logrolling, in which votes are traded on
different issues. H & A suggest that this is not important insofar as feelings about
redistribution are much more intense than feelings about other issues. The
second problem cited is the model's failure to account for differential rates of
voter participation, which tend to be directly related to income. But H & R
suggest that it would be easy to adjust the model for this phenomenon, treating
variations in voter participation as analytically equivalent to corresponding
reductions in voter population in each income class.
3. Empirical Evidence on Distributional Preferences (Parts IV and V.)
In this section H & A seek to derive and apply empirical evidence on voter
attitudes toward redistribution, using the results of several opinion polls
on welfare spending conducted with a sample of California voters in 1970. Their
primary purpose is to obtain measures of the nature and extent of nonrecipient
support for welfare programs (viewed as an imperfect proxy for generalized
redistribution to the poor). The results of the poll were classified by income
class; because of strong discontinuities in responses, an income level of $7,000
was identified as the breakpoint between nonrecipients and actual or potential
recipients of welfare transfers.
The poll results show that large majorities of all income classes consider some
amount of welfare spending as a "moral imperative," but the level of welfare
spending considered adequate is on the whole inversely related to the respon-
dent's income level. H & A focus particular attention on the relationship between
the percentage of voters viewing some welfare spending as a "moral impera-
tive" and the percentage of voters who believe that welfare spending helps
prevent crime. Among non recipients, the latter percentage is interpreted as an
upper limit on a measure of the frequency with which distributional preferences
reflect self-interest arising from negative externalities. The difference between
the two percentages (subject to a minor correction) is interpreted as a lower limit
on a measure of the frequency with which distributional preferences reflect
The Simple Politics of Distributional Preference109I
"benevolence" rather than "narrow self-interest.' This minimum indicator of
"benevolence" varies directly with income and averages around 50 percent for
the nonrecipient population.
H & A consider their finding of such a high level of "benevolence' a highly
significant one in the context of their models of democratic decision making.
They also take satisfaction from the fact that the positive correlation between
income and "benevolence" is consistent with a utility-maximization model in
which benevolent transfers are a normal good.
H & R then go on to examine the question of whether nonrecipient concern
about welfare recipients is based upon the recipients' general level of self-
perceived utility or applies to their particular sources and uses of income. The
percentage of voter support for public provision of housing to those who cannot
afford it is interpreted as an upper limit on nonrecipient preference for particular-
commodity rather than general-utility concern. This percentage is subtracted
from the previously derived percentage measuring "benevolence" to get a new
measure representing a lower limit on nonrecipient concern for the general
welfare of the poor, This lower limit rises with the income class of nonrecipients
from negative figures to a maximum of about 25 percent in the highest income
class. H & R infer that 'donor concern with the self-perceived well-being of
welfare recipients is a normal good" (p. 93).and that support of redistribution by
nonrecipients "is disproportionately derived from those donors with the highest
incomes" (p. 931.
Finally, H & R address themselves to the issues of whether nonrecipient
donors are concerned with the self-perceived welfare or the money income of
recipients. The percentage of voters agreeing that able-bodied men should not
collect welfare is subtracted from the percentage believing in some welfare
spending as a "moral imperative" to get a measure of the "lower limit on the
extent to which nonrecipient supporters of welfare spending are likely to support
a simple program of cash transfers containing no work requirement provisions"
(p. 94). This measure averages about 10 percent and does not vary with income
class.
In Part V (pp. 94—99), H & R go on to estimate tentatively the degree to which
nonrecipient support is actually needed in order to pass motions concerning
welfare spending. Using referenda considered implicit in further sample polling
in California in 1970, H & R calculate the support required from nonrecipients to
reach total support levels ranging from 25 percent to 75 percent (the limits on
required voter support to enact motions in a representative democracy). The
results indicate that to reach a total support level of 50 percent, motions to
increase welfare spending require 55 percent supportfrom nonrecipients, while
motions to decrease welfare spending require 60 percent support from nonreci-
pients. Both of these support levels exceed by a considerable margin the
corresponding actual frequencies suggested by nonrecipient responses to the
polling; H & R draw the implication that current levels of welfare spending are
stable under a system not too far from simple majority rule.
Finally, H & R attempt to bring to bear their estimates of nonrecipient
"benevolence" (lower limit: 50 percent) and nonrecipient preference for cash
transfers (lower limit:10 percent) on the prospects for enacting transfer
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they say nothing about the magnitude of the program or the marginal prefer-
ences of nonrecipients at current levels of spending. At this point, H & R must
introduce some strong assumptions about the structure of nonrecipient prefer-
ences in order to conclude (ever so tentatively) that a motion to increase the level
of transfer programs might have a chance to pass in a favorably distributed
representative democracy.
In their concluding remarks, H & R underline the weakness of their empirical
evidence and urge further work both on constructing theoretical models and on
collecting a suitable body of microdata to estimate and to apply the models.
II. CRITIQUE
H & R have written an article that is in many ways ingenious, and I trust that it will
be considered an interesting contribution to its particular field of research. As
one who is not very familiar with work in this field,Ishall find it difficult to
separate criticism of assumptions and practices common to most researchers in
the field from criticism of H & R's work in particular. Indeed, I suspect that much
of my criticism will really be applicable to the field as a whole. If so, I hope it will
be understood that I am not singling out H & R for reprobation, but rather that I
am raising a few basic issues that seem to me to call for more careful thought by
all researchers in this area.
Ishall divide my comments into three sections: a discussion of the authors'
models of democratic decision making, an analysis of the authors' use of the
concept of 'benevolence," and some concluding observations.
1. Models of Democracy The models of direct and representative democracy
constructed by H & R in Parts II and Ill are very neatly and cogently developed.
The analysis of representative democracy, in particular, leads to some interest-
ing implications that, if not exactly counter-intuitive, are nonetheless far from
obvious at the start. I have no criticism to make at the level of logical consistency
and mathematical accuracy.
However, I do feel that H & R's analysis reflects an extraordinary degree of
naiveté about the way the political process works in a real-world "democracy"
such as that of the United States. H &Rare aware that they are imposing certain
simplifying assumptions on their model of representative democracy; the most
important of these are spelled out (Pt. Ill). After concluding their analysis they
cite two major "complications"—logrolling and variableratesofvoter
participation—which might affect the conclusions that they draw. But one is left
with the impression that no other major factor would interfere with the validity of
their results.
Completely ignored by H & R is any hint of a relationship between economic
and political power, other than one mediated by actual voter participation. In this
era of Watergate, it should hardly need to be stressed that a realistic analysis of
the American political process must deal with the various mechanisms whereby
the rich can translate their economic power into disproportionate influence
on political decisions. Whether through the financing of political campaigns, the
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economically powerful can have a decisive influence on what questions are
submitted for political decision making, on the form in which they are posed, and
on the outcome of any votes.
Indeed, how can models of representative democracy of the kind used by H &
R begin to explain the numerous cases of "antiwelfare" programs that charac-
terize contemporary American society? Through tax loopholes, subsidies,
special treatment, and so forth, many high-income Americans are able to bring
about redistribution in their own favor at the expense of the great majority of
citizens in the low-income and/or middle-income classes. To explain such
phenomena one must deal seriously with the vastly unequal distribution of
effective political power that characterizes the American system of democracy.
H & A might suggest that "differential voter effectiveness" could be incorpo-
rated into their model in the same way that variable voter participation rates
could. But this would beg the question—for the model itself does nothing to
illuminate the immensely important links between economic and political
power.
A second important criticism of H & R's model of the political process is that it
is rooted in the dominant liberal conception of a system of independent voters,
with independently determined and consistently articulated preferences. Yet
the presumption of "voter sovereignty" in democratic politics seems to this
critic to be no more tenable than the presumption of "consumer sovereignty" in
capitalist economies. Although each individual votes in isolation, he/she is
continuously bombarded with opinion-molding influences ranging from overt
propaganda to subtle persuasion. The result is that rational and predictable utility
maximization (however broadly construed) may have great difficulty emerging in
even the most (formally) democratic of political systems.
2. Self-interest and BenevolenceH & R make much of the distinction
between "narrow self-interest" and "benevolence" as independent motives for
nonrecipient support of redistributive programs. Both of these words are highly
charged with moral connotations. "Narrow self-interest" suggests a kind of
scheming egoism which is morally repugnant. "Benevolence" suggests admira-
ble and virtuous behavior: "an inclination to do good; kindliness," according
to Webster's dictionary. H & R insist that their notion of "benevolence" is not
associated with altruism and its suggestion of selflessness (p. 751, but their most
important category of benevolence—concern with the welfare of others, for
their own sake—certainly suggests altruistic behavior.
Words do matter. Much of H & R's concern focuses on the extent of
"benevolence" on the part of nonrecipients of welfare spending, i.e., the middle
and upper classes. Indeed, one of the most significant conclusions reported by H
& R is a remarkably high (at least 50 percent) incidence of "benevolence" among
nonrecipientclassesintheUnitedStates.Animplicationofthis
finding—perhaps not conscious on the part of the authors, but certainly part of
the message conveyed by their article—is that the American system is blessed
with a happy correlation of wealth and virtue. This is a political message and a
conservative one.
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terms and the difficulty of pursuing politically neutral social-science research.
want to suggest that the political issues bound up with the authors' research
may well have affected their interpretation of the data. For it seems to me that
the inferences they draw from the voter-attitude polls are biased in overem-
phasizing the "benevolence" of the middle- and upper-income classes and
consequently exaggerating the potential for equity in the American social order.
H & R derive their critical quantitative measure of "benevolence" from
differences in the polled responses to two statements, the first implying that
welfare is a moral imperative and the second implying that welfare prevents
crime. The measure of "benevolence" thus obtained is inflated by at least two
sources of bias. First, agreement with the statement "in spite of some waste in
the welfare program, it would be morally wrong to do away with it" (note to Table
2) may reflect a variety of attitudes other than a genuine interest in redistribution.
Respondents might feel that, once instituted, a welfare program should not
suddenly be abolished because of the commitments and expectations gener-
ated by it. Respondents might feel that as a statement of general principle they
should espouse what appears to be a laudably "Christian" attitude, without
necessarily being prepared to pay for the cost of the programs implied.
More serious, however, is the bias introduced by treating agreement with the
statement: "Ifit weren't for welfare, there would be a lot more stealing,
burglaries, and other crime" (note to Table 2) as the upper limit on support for
redistribution for reasons other than benevolence. Crime is only one of many
possible sources of negative externalities that might induce the middle and
upper classes to support redistributive transfers in their own self-interest. Not
only should specific social maladies such as disease and drug traffic be added to
the list, but more generally,I would think that a concern for maintaining the
overall stability of the social system (from which they benefit) would motivate
the middle and upper classes to alleviate conditions of poverty that might lead to
social and political turmoil. Indeed, the history of American welfare spending
suggests thatitis precisely when threats to the social order arise that
redistributive programsget enacted and implemented (see, for example,
Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor, 1972). To suggest that
this is the result of "benevolence" rather than enlightened self-interest seems
to me to distort words or to misread history.
Ignoring the above reasons for suspecting that their estimate of the incidence
of benevolence is much too high, H & R actually regard their estimate as a
minimum measure. This is apparently because a positive response to the
welfare-prevents-crime statement, contrary to the assumption on which their
numerical calculation is based, need not necessarily exclude the motive of
"benevolence." Self-interested concern about negative externalities may coex-
ist with some degree of "benevolence" in the same individual. To the extent that
this is true, and ceteris paribus, the incidence of "benevolence" would be
underestimated by the H & A procedure.
Currently available data do not permit one to determine the precise quantita-
tive significance of this last source of misestimation; I should very much doubt
that it offsets the effects of the sources of upward bias in H & A's estimate of the
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incidence of 'benevolence." But even if it does so, it does nothing to offset the
downward bias in H & R's estimate of the incidence of self-interested concern
about negative externalities. Such concern is clearly far more important than
suggested by H & R. And it follows that inquiry into political support for
redistribution in a society such as ours should focus much more attention on the
perceived self-interest of the middle- and upper-income classes.
My emphasis on "self-interest" rather than "benevolence" as a motivating
force should not be attributed to a generalized cynicism about human nature. On
the contrary, Ibelieve that human beings have an immense potential for
benevolence. The problem is that this potential may be frustrated by the
particular institutional framework within which individuals act. In a capitalist
society, one is expected to act in, and one is rewarded for acting in, one's narrow
self-interest. To act in a benevolent manner is to act counter to the logic of the
system, very possibly to one's own detriment. It is therefore only realistic to
expect that under capitalism self-interest will play a much more important role
than benevolence. And it follows that a greater degree of benevolence can only
be expected under a very different socioeconomic system, with a very different
pattern of values and incentives.
3. ConclusionIn their own conclusion (Part VI), H & A introduce a radical/lib-
eral dichotomy of the kind that has almost become de rigueur in contemporary
writing in the social sciences. Radicals "suggest that distributive justice requires
a radical restructuring of social institutions" (p. 100); liberals 'argue that more
redistribution would occur if only the democratic political process. .. could be
made to more accurately reflect the 'true' preferences of the voters" (p. 100). As a
longtime member of the Union for Radical Political Economics, I accept H & R's
characterization of the radical position on distributive justice and I espouse it. Yet
at the same time, I see no reason to disagree with the liberal argument cited by H
& A. If the American democratic political process could be made more truly
democratic, I have no reason to doubt that more redistribution would occur than
at present. This follows directly from my observation that the American political
process is one which now grants vastly disproportionate political power to the
rich vis-à-vis the poor.
Ibelieve that there are two principal questions—one normative, one
positive—that really divide radicals and liberals in their approach to the issue of
distribution: (1) What constitutes "distributive justice"? and (2) What would it
take to make the American political process truly democratic? The radical
response to each question would involve a much greater departure from the
current American status quo than would the liberal response.
H & A's posing of the radical/liberal dichotomy is thus misleading. Their
subsequent comments also seem to me very questionable. H & R imply that
their characterization of the liberal approach to the issues is much more "open to
inquiry" than the radical approach (p. 100). Why is not a potentially radical
restructuring of social institutions open to inquiry? Why is the investigation of
distributional preferences "within a predefined system of rights and rules" the
prior research issue? I need hardly emphasize the conservative conception of
the role of the intellectual which is reflected in such remarks.
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